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Abstract 
Both scholars and international actors frequently stress the important role played by anti-civilian ideologies in escalat-
ing risks of mass atrocities against civilians. Yet strategies to combat and counter anti-civilian ideologies remain an un-
certain and understudied component of atrocity prevention, and scepticism about their efficacy is to be expected. This 
paper provides a preliminary framework for thinking about strategies and interventions designed to counter the ideo-
logical causes of mass atrocities. First, I briefly clarify what existing research seems to suggest the role of ideology in 
mass atrocities is, and is not. I caution against cruder or overly strong theses about the role ideology plays, but clarify 
that whilst ideology’s actual causal impact is varying and complex, it is also significant. Second, I clarify what ideological 
interventions and strategies might be reasonably expected to do, and comparatively assess them against more domi-
nant existing prevention tools to show that their preventive potential is sufficiently high to warrant usage. Finally, I pro-
vide guidelines on how the effort to formulate ideological strategies and interventions for preventing mass atrocities 
should best proceed. 
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1. Introduction 
Scholars and international actors have frequently iden-
tified ideology as a factor which affects the risk of mass 
atrocities (Alvarez, 2008; Chalk & Jonassohn, 1990, p. 
37; Gellately & Kiernan, 2003, p. 375; Malešević, 2006, 
p. 209; Shaw, 2003, pp. 40-41, 100-123; Straus, 2012a; 
Valentino, 2004, pp. 71-72). Prominent early-warning 
or risk assessment models, such as those of Barbara 
Harff (2003) or the UN Office for the Prevention of 
Genocide and the Responsibility to Protect (United 
Nations, 2014), also generally incorporate measures of 
ideology, or ideologically implicated phenomena like 
propaganda, hate speech, or extremism, into their core 
monitoring criteria. If ideology plays a significant causal 
role in mass atrocities, it should be a logical object of 
study for mass atrocity prevention.1 
Yet little such study presently exists. Strategies to 
combat anti-civilian ideologies (Slim, 2007)—via inter-
ventions such as peace broadcasting, empowerment 
and protection of moderate voices, regulation of ideo-
logical producers like the media and political parties, or 
educational efforts designed to cultivate opposition to 
violence—are weakly formulated in theory, and rarely 
attempted in practice.2 Whilst the post-Cold War peri-
od has seen a considerable increase in military and 
economic attempts to combat humanitarian crises, a 
                                                          
1 For early work, though not orientated around the concept of 
ideology, see Metzl (1997), Price (2000), Price and Thompson 
(2002). 
2 Such policies are more prevalent in peacebuilding and coun-
ter-terrorism, see Bratić (2008) and Gregg (2010). 
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self-reinforcing inertia holds back ideological strate-
gies. Given the dearth of knowledge about them, such 
strategies are understandably seen as carrying uncer-
tain prospects of success, and therefore rarely used. In 
a vicious cycle, this then results in few cases for the 
empirical research that would improve understanding 
of their prospects of success and best practices.  
This paper makes the case for escaping this vicious 
cycle, and turning ideological strategies and interven-
tions into key components of mass atrocity prevention. 
I argue that on comparative analysis ideological strate-
gies and interventions are not inferior to dominant mil-
itary, economic and diplomatic policies of prevention, 
if they are conducted with appropriately modest ambi-
tions and sophisticated planning. We need more pre-
vention tools, not fewer (Bellamy, 2011, p. 6). Ideologi-
cal strategies are unlikely to independently halt a 
genocide or mass atrocity on their own, but they have 
the potential to substantially frustrate campaigns of vi-
olence and thereby save lives, whilst carrying fewer 
risks and lower costs than more radical interventions. 
They ought to be a key element (one of several) in the 
atrocity prevention toolkit. 
I make this argument in three steps.3 First, I clarify 
what existing research seems to suggest the role of 
ideology in mass atrocities is, and is not. I caution 
against cruder or overly strong theses about the role 
ideology plays, but clarify that whilst ideology’s actual 
causal impact is varying and complex, it is also signifi-
cant. Second, I comparatively assess ideological strate-
gies against conventional prevention tools to show that 
their preventive potential is sufficiently high to warrant 
usage. Third, I provide guidelines on how the formula-
tion of ideological strategies and interventions for pre-
venting mass atrocities should best proceed. 
My argument here is not that ideological interven-
tions and strategies will assuredly end mass atrocities 
once and for all. But no existing policy or set of policies 
meets such a high standard. Prevention remains a 
somewhat experimental endeavour, and the consider-
able risks involved are warranted only because the 
consequences of inaction are so severe. It is therefore 
crucial to formulate prevention policies with extensive 
and sober attention to risks and contextual complexi-
ties, and with a wide range of potential preventive 
tools under consideration. The ultimate objective 
should be to generate a panoply of different ideological 
strategies and interventions to be made available to 
policy makers, with guidance on how they should be 
implemented, their prospects of success, and the con-
ditions when they are and are not advisable. 
I also emphasise that whilst my argument here is 
partly normative—advocating ideological strategies—I 
                                                          
3 For a succinct policy-brief on ideological strategies (of which I 
was the principal author) see Australian Civil-Military Centre & 
Oxford Institute for Ethics, Law and Armed Conflict (2013).  
do not fully address all relevant normative controver-
sies here. Like all atrocity prevention tools, ideological 
interventions and strategies can be misused and 
abused, and carry moral risks, with free speech con-
cerns particularly salient. Such concerns warrant de-
bate, but again, they are not fundamentally deeper or 
more intractable than those attached to other estab-
lished prevention policies. They should not stop ideo-
logical strategies and interventions from being part of 
the prevention toolkit. 
Throughout this paper, I use ideology to mean a 
distinctive system of normative and/or purportedly fac-
tual ideas, typically shared by members of groups or 
societies, which shapes their understandings of their 
political world and guides their political behaviour. This 
is a self-consciously broad definition, consistent with 
key trends in the specialist study of ideology (Freeden, 
1996; Gerring, 1997; Hamilton, 1987; Jost, 2006; Knight, 
2006) as well as much work on political violence and 
mass atrocities (Alvarez, 2008, pp. 215-220; Sanín & 
Wood, 2014, p. 214). It abandons the misleading as-
sumption that ideology always takes the form of highly 
elaborate theory, immovable convictions, or fanatical 
dogma. Instead the concept of ideology should be used 
expansively to grapple with the wide variety of distinc-
tive systems of ideas through which individuals and 
groups engage in “actual political thinking” (Freeden, 
2008, p. 197).4 I use ideological strategies to refer to an 
overall effort to counter the ideological causes of mass 
atrocities with respect to a particular context, and ideo-
logical interventions to refer to the specific tools that 
may be deployed as part of such a strategy. 
2. How Ideology Catalyses Mass Atrocities 
A key obstacle to considering exactly how ideology ca-
talyses mass violence is the common tendency to con-
fine it to only a narrow range of especially blatant 
causal roles. Often, both in studies that emphasise ide-
ology’s role (Goldhagen, 2010; Kaufman, 2001, 2006) 
or that express some scepticism (Kalyvas, 2006, pp. 44-
48; Mueller, 2000; Waller, 2007, pp. 40-53, 102-104, 
124, 185) scholars focus on intergroup hatreds, explicit 
incitement, exterminationist tendencies, or other overt 
forms of extremism, and portray “ideological” individ-
uals as highly committed “true believers”. Ideologies 
do sometimes play such roles, and a few participants in 
mass violence match classic images of the hate-filled 
fanatic. But confining our attention to such extreme 
ideological manifestations results in a very narrow lens 
of focus. It deflects attention from the broader range 
of causal links between ideology and mass atrocities, 
and from the more nuanced range of ways in which ac-
                                                          
4 I shall not focus on conceptual/definitional issues further in 
this paper, but for clarifications see Leader Maynard (2014, pp. 
823-825; 2015, pp. 191-193). 
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tors can be influenced by ideology (Leader Maynard, 
2014).  
Close research on perpetrators, like Christopher 
Browning’s (2001) work on Police Battalion 101 or Lee 
Ann Fujii’s (2008, 2009) study of Rwandan genocidaires 
illustrates the wrongness of crude, monocausal expla-
nations cashed out only in terms of ideological fanati-
cism and ethnic hatred. But they do not show that ide-
ology, understood more broadly, lacked causal power 
in shaping perpetrator behaviour—and Browning him-
self explicitly affirms its importance (Browning, 2001, 
pp. 150-151, 182, 220-221). Ideologies can encourage 
violence at far weaker or more ambivalent levels of be-
lief than fanaticism, and through mechanisms beside 
hatred. And whilst total internalisation of an ideology 
in given individuals is rare, partial internalisation is 
common, with particular atrocity-justifying beliefs, as-
sumptions, frames or ethics influencing perpetrator 
behaviour (Leader Maynard, 2015). The exact role ide-
ology plays thus varies across individuals according to 
different degrees of internalisation, and the presence 
or absence of other motives connected with self-
interest, opportunism, experience of coercion, con-
formity to peer pressure, and so forth (Smeulers, 
2008). In general, ideological plays a synergistic and of-
ten necessary role in tandem with such motives to link 
them to violence. So fanaticism may be rare. But all 
mass atrocities nevertheless possess, as Alvarez (2008, 
p. 215) argues, “an ideological component that is inte-
gral to enabling and facilitating the perpetration of this 
particular form of group violence.” 
The body of research supporting this claim is exten-
sive. Amongst the direct perpetrators of atrocities, 
studies like Omar Bartov’s (1994) detailed examination 
of the letters and diaries of Wehrmacht soldiers, Mi-
chael Mann’s (2000) biographical analysis of fifteen 
hundred perpetrators, or Yaacov Lozowick’s (2000) 
study of German bureaucrats under the Nazis, empha-
sise how internalisation of Nazi ideology was important 
for participation in genocide. So does the testimony 
(against their self-interest) of former perpetrators and 
witnesses, in memoirs like those of the Commandant 
of Auschwitz Rudolf Hoess (1959) or the Bolshevik-
turned-dissident Lev Kopelev (1977), or in interview 
data collected by Jean Hatzfield (2005) in Rwanda or 
Orlando Figes (2002) in the former Soviet Union. At the 
level of elite policy makers, documentary evidence like 
that collected in John Arch Getty and Oleg Naumov’s 
(1999) compendium of Soviet government texts from 
Stalin’s terror or Jeremy Noakes and Jeffrey Pridham’s 
(1988) similar volume on Nazi atrocities repeatedly il-
lustrate how ideological justifications shaped the deci-
sions to initiate atrocities. Ideology is also highlighted 
in numerous comparative case studies. Stuart Kaufman 
(2001) emphasises the importance of elite decisions to 
deploy, or refrain from, exclusivist and aggressive 
symbolic politics that resonate with broader populations 
in determining whether ethnic atrocities occur. Eric 
Weitz (2003), Michael Mann (2005) and Scott Straus 
(2015) all similarly demonstrate how conceptions of 
states as ethnically pure communities create strong 
pressures towards what Straus terms “mass categorical 
violence”. And Alex Bellamy (2012b) analyses the role 
played by recurring justificatory patterns in mass atroc-
ities across cases as wide ranging as the French revolu-
tionary terror, the Armenian genocide, the Boer War, 
genocide against the Native Americans, Belgian exploi-
tation of the Congo, the Holocaust, Stalin’s Great Ter-
ror, and a range of Cold War atrocities by capitalist and 
communist states alike. 
Exactly how ideologies causally contribute to vio-
lence is complex, however (Leader Maynard, 2014, pp. 
825-833). Both the specific ideologies of political ac-
tors, and the broader ideological environment in which 
those actors exist, shape their behaviour. All political 
practices, violent and non-violent, occur in certain 
ideological environments: social worlds characterised 
by distributions of different ideologies amongst the 
population and the embedding of those ideologies in 
institutions and discourses.5 Such environments are 
always vitally heterogeneous, but they are neverthe-
less patterned and analysable. Rather than a chaotic 
anarchy of disagreement and mutual incomprehension, 
they have a complex topography defined by certain 
convergences and divergences in ways of thinking. In 
these ideological environments, certain things are 
thinkable and sayable, certain things likely to provoke 
support from certain groups and opposition from oth-
ers, certain things likely to be widely believed and oth-
ers given little credence, certain things comprehensi-
ble, resonant, powerful, and fashionable, and certain 
things ephemeral, turgid, mysterious or dull. Along 
with the material environment, this ideological envi-
ronment (plus individuals’ own personal ideologies) 
shapes actors’ political behaviour: determining the like-
ly outcomes of certain claims, policies, and events and 
consequently the costs and benefits political actors 
perceive as accruing from certain acts. Ideological envi-
ronments are changeable and constantly changing, in 
large part through the dissemination of new ideological 
discourse by influential actors. But as all efforts to 
change them occur within the existing environment, 
ideological change occurs by rapid or gradual accretion, 
building off what has been laid before (Ball, Farr, & 
Hanson, 1989, p. 3). 
Both overall ideological environments and particu-
lar ideologies within those environments can, on bal-
                                                          
5 These ideological environments are one aspect of the broader 
“political environments” described by Wolfsfeld (2004, p. 25). 
They include but are not exhausted by structures of “norms” in 
the sense widely studied by international relations theorists 
(Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998), since ideologies contain more 
than just normative beliefs and perceptions. 
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ance, catalyse or restrain mass atrocities (Straus, 
2012b, 2015). But ideologies or ideological environ-
ments shouldn’t be thought of as simply pro- or anti- 
violence in their totality. All ideologies, and thus all 
ideological environments, contain a broad amalgam of 
ideas, some of which are conducive to violence, and 
some of which problematise it. Possibly barring the 
strongest forms of pacifism, no ideology contains abso-
lutely no material for the justification of mass violence 
(Ceadel, 1987). Equally, even a mass murderous ideol-
ogy like Nazism contained some elements (such as an 
adulation of discipline and order) that restrained vio-
lence in certain times and contexts—contributing, for 
example, to the early emigration rather than mass kill-
ing of Jews, the prohibition of rape in the occupied 
Eastern territories, and the generally lower level of vio-
lence in occupied Western Europe (Bartov, 1994, pp. 
60-69; Browning, 2004, Ch. 3; Semelin, 1993, pp. 5-20). 
Most ideologies and ideological environments possess 
a greater mix of catalysing and restraining elements 
than Nazism or Pacifism. Ideologies and ideological en-
vironments are thus characterised by an aggregate 
balance of pressure at particular points of time, and it 
is this balance between catalysing and restraining ele-
ments which is critical (Semelin, 1993, p. 141; Straus, 
2015, pp. 34-41). 
Difference in this balance of ideological pressure is 
a key variable in distinguishing contexts where mass 
atrocities are a real possibility from those where they 
are unlikely. This is true between cases: Straus (2015) 
shows how differences in the ideological environments 
of Rwanda and Sudan, on the one hand, and Senegal, 
Mali and Côte d’Ivoire on the other, were critical for 
genocide occurring in the former but not in the latter. 
But such ideological variation also matters within cas-
es. Vladimir Solonari (2010, p. 193-199) highlights how 
varying participation in the persecution of Jews in Ro-
mania during World War II was shaped by local Chris-
tian attitudes: general indifference facilitated violence 
against Jews, but violence was lower in areas of ideo-
logical opposition (see also Semelin, 1993, pp. 139-
140). David Yanagizawa-Drott’s (2014) study of the im-
pact of the RTLM radio station in Rwanda likewise 
demonstrates that areas with greater saturation of Hu-
tu power ideology saw substantially higher violence. 
And Jacques Semelin (1993) shows how varying levels 
of resistance to genocide in Nazi occupied Europe simi-
larly rested on the strength of local ideological atti-
tudes opposed to violence against Jews (see also Mon-
roe, 2011).  
Importantly, these attitudes did not just matter be-
cause they directly encouraged resistance. Knowledge 
of the ideological inclinations of the local populace 
shaped decisions by policy makers too: Nazi concerns 
about, for example, public opinion in Scandinavia en-
couraged comparatively weak implementation of Holo-
caust policies in Denmark, Norway and Nazi-allied Fin-
land (Semelin, 1993, pp. 132-133, 137-140). By con-
trast, (correct) expectations of local sympathy for mass 
violence against Jews in much of Eastern Europe facili-
tated the choice for radical exterminationist policies in 
these areas. So the ideological topography of a society 
influences the topography of violence.6 And this topog-
raphy of violence is analytically and morally important. 
A more varied topography of violence may not count as 
a mass atrocity “prevented”. But it may mean more ar-
eas where dozens, hundreds or thousands of potential 
victims might be saved. 
The specific ideologies espoused by individual ac-
tors—whether elite decision-makers, potential direct 
killers, bureaucratic intermediaries, bystanders, or res-
cuers and resisters—can catalyse or restrain violence in 
a wide range of ways. Three cross-cutting distinctions 
are of particular importance. First, elements of ideolo-
gies may actually constitute the sincerely internalised 
beliefs of members of these various categories, but 
they may also be used for key instrumental functions, 
such as mobilising support, politically legitimating ac-
tions to others, providing co-ordinating roadmaps for 
policy, and so forth (see also Sanin and Wood, 2014). 
Second, ideologies may shape key emotional and eval-
uative stances, thereby shaping normative beliefs and 
key value commitments (Atran & Axelrod, 2008; Sanín 
& Wood, 2014, pp. 220-222), but they may also provide 
or shape key descriptive beliefs about matters of fact 
(Hochschild, 2001). Indeed the evaluative and descrip-
tive beliefs tend to be heavily interrelated. Hutu power 
ideology in Rwanda, for example, rested in part on a 
deep evaluative degradation of the Tutsi and a spread 
of a genocidal norm permitting mass violence (Fujii, 
2004; Melson, 2003). But at least equally critical were 
descriptive claims that Tutsi really were engaging in 
calculated conspiratorial activities to undermine the 
state from within, to assist the invading Rwandan Pat-
riotic Front, and to exterminate the Hutu, claims which 
seemed plausible in light of the broader ideological en-
vironment (Semelin, 2005, pp. 171-174; Yanagizawa-
Drott, 2014, p. 1954). Finally, ideologies may actually 
motivate action, making atrocities appear desirable, 
but they also legitimate action, making atrocities ap-
pear permissible. Even if many perpetrators of atroci-
ties have rather mundane, self-interested materialist 
motives—as some scholars suggest (Gerlach, 2010; 
Mueller, 2000)—ideology may still be necessary to 
make violence in pursuit of those motives seem legiti-
mate. Clearly, for example, colonialist atrocities against 
indigenous peoples were heavily motivated by greed. 
But mass murder which would have been unthinkable 
against fellow Europeans was rendered easy in the Eu-
ropean empires by ideological notions of the low moral 
                                                          
6 It is obviously not the only factor here—levels of control and 
the nature of local social networks are, for example, also criti-
cal, see Semelin (1993), Kalyvas (2006) and Fujii (2008). 
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status and minimal rights of “natives” (Bellamy, 2012a).  
Research on mass atrocities has identified a wealth 
of different ways in which ideological beliefs justify vio-
lence by producing motives and legitimations. I have 
suggested elsewhere (Leader Maynard 2014, pp. 829-
833, 2015, pp. 195-212) that most of these can be or-
ganised into a framework of six key recurring “justifica-
tory mechanisms”. Ideologies tend to catalyse violence 
by:  
i) encouraging dehumanised conceptions of po-
tential victims; 
ii) asserting that the victims are guilty of crimes 
and thus deserve to suffer violence; 
iii) constructing dangerous threats to society, or 
groups within society, and assertively connect-
ing these threats to potential victims; 
iv)  engaging in the destruction of perceived alter-
natives to violence, making it seem inevitable or 
the only option; 
v) valorising violence through virtuetalk, where 
violence is framed as demonstrating praisewor-
thy character traits like duty, toughness, loyalty, 
patriotism, etc.; and 
vi)  identifying future goods or specifying key politi-
cal objectives which the violence, it is promised, 
will yield. 
These all encourage people to side-line competing ide-
ological restraints on violence, and provide the claims, 
impressions, semi-conscious attitudes and frameworks 
of reasoning that can make violence look like the right 
course of action (see also Chirot and McCauley, 2006, 
p. 5). The ideologies of key policy makers of atrocities 
are typically characterised by all these justificatory 
mechanisms. And they are disseminated via media, ed-
ucational and political institutions, and social net-
works—becoming to varying degrees internalised by 
members of broader groups and societies. Through 
such ideological dissemination, the ideological envi-
ronment is thereby altered in ways that raise the likeli-
hood of mass atrocities.  
Emphasis of ideology should not involve a denial of 
other causal factors, and the centrality and blatancy of 
ideology will vary across cases. Its role is stark in the 
totalitarian atrocities of Nazi Germany (Bartov, 1994; 
Koonz, 2003), Stalinist Russia (Arch Getty & Naumov, 
1999; Goldman, 2011), Khmer Rouge Cambodia 
(Chandler 2000; Hinton, 1998; Jackson, 1989) or Mao’s 
China (Bellamy, 2012b, pp. 237-259). In a wide range of 
other cases, ideology’s role is less obvious but still criti-
cal. In the Yugoslavian wars, for example, there is good 
evidence that many killers were motivated more by 
loot and the internal dynamics of vicious hooliganistic 
paramilitary groups than by high nationalism (Mueller, 
2000). And the Serbian, Bosnian and Croatian popula-
tions were far less penetrated by long-standing ethnic 
animosities that is commonly suggested (Gagnon, 
2004; Malešević, 2006, pp. 168-184). Yet the pattern-
ing of violence remained consistent with its underlying 
ideological rationale in spite of these other motives 
and mindsets. Nationalist discourses, myths and ru-
mours conducive to violence were heavily disseminat-
ed in the late 1980s and early 1990s, with the result 
that these potential perpetrators and their supporters 
had internalised ideological conceptions that shaped 
behaviour, including threatening representations of 
other groups, perceptions that violence was the only 
acceptable course, and brutal militarist attitudes, espe-
cially amongst the paramilitaries (Cigar, 1995; Semelin, 
2003, pp. 358-361). And ideology also filled important 
instrumental roles, being utilised opportunistically by 
elites to mobilise support, denounce and castigate mod-
erates, and to co-opt paramilitaries and funnel their vio-
lence against other ethnicities (Gagnon, 2004; Gordy, 
1999). Cross-case variation thus inheres in the different 
specific ways ideology exerts causal pressure, and the 
varying strength of that pressure vis-á-vis other factors. 
Binary frameworks that merely ask whether ideology 
“does” or “does not” matter, by contrast, are simply 
too blunt for both scholarly and practitioner analysis. 
3. The Need for Ideological Prevention 
Even if ideology is a key cause of mass atrocities, it 
does not necessarily follow that ideological prevention 
strategies are advisable. International policy makers 
have often treated the ideological foundations of vio-
lence as immutable. The wars in Yugoslavia produced a 
panoply of such statements, with President Bush de-
scribing the conflict as rooted in “age-old animosities 
[and] century-old feuds”, US Acting Secretary of State 
Lawrence Eagleburger asserting “this war is not ration-
al. There is no rationality at all about ethnic conflict. It 
is gut, it is hatred; it is not for any set of values or pur-
poses; it just goes on,” (Power, 2003, p. 282) and John 
Major famously stating to the UK Parliament that out-
side intervention would be futile given the “ancient ha-
treds” involved (Allcock, 2000, p. 2). Such portrayals 
are now almost universally rejected in scholarship. But 
the more nuanced understanding of the role of ideolo-
gy I have advanced still does not suggest that it is easy 
to counter ideological catalysts of atrocity. As Benjamin 
Valentino points out, “influencing the basic structures 
or attitudes of societies from the outside remains an 
extraordinarily difficult task…international actors do 
not yet understand how to build democracies or foster 
more harmonious relations between groups.” 
(Valentino, 2004, p. 238) Policy makers therefore cur-
rently respond to risks of atrocity with a more familiar 
set of policy tools: military intervention, peacekeepers, 
economic sanctions, and mediation (and sometimes al-
so international justice mechanisms, and international 
commissions of inquiry).  
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But it is the very familiarity of some of these atroci-
ty prevention tools which is the problem, creating a 
beguiling impression of a powerful, “hard” toolkit of 
standard responses which states and the UN Security 
Council can implement. On close comparative inspec-
tion, it is not clear that traditional tools for atrocity 
prevention are superior to ideological strategies. I as-
sume that all tools of atrocity prevention should be 
kept available to policy makers, and that multi-method 
co-ordinated approaches are necessary for success. So 
in identifying the weaknesses of traditional atrocity 
prevention tools in this section I am not arguing that 
they should not be used. But they are not of some dif-
ferent order of viability when compared to ideological 
strategies. It is therefore problematic, given the medi-
ocre performance of standard tools, that they currently 
crowd out more innovative approaches (de Waal, 
Meierhenrich, & Conley-Zilkic, 2012, p. 18). 
3.1. The Uneven Record of Traditional Prevention Tools 
An uncomfortable reality about research on the tradi-
tional tools of atrocity prevention is the rather gloomy 
picture it paints of all of them. Almost all these tools 
suffer from “rally round the flag effects”, being utilised 
by local political elites to legitimate their regime and 
generate national and regional solidarity against out-
siders, perversely increasing atrocity perpetrators’ 
power (Krain, 2005, p. 371; Peskin, 2009, pp. 307-309; 
Smith, 2012, p. 11; Weiss, 1999, p. 502). Evidence on 
these tools’ efficacy, though extant, is extremely une-
ven, with few clear cut successes. As Alex Bellamy 
(2010, p. 599) points out, “with only two partial excep-
tions, once begun, genocidal killing ends in only one of 
two ways—by perpetrators deciding they have 
achieved their objectives or with their military defeat” 
(see also de Waal et al., 2012, pp. 19-21). Of the two 
exceptions, one (the mass killing of the inhabitants of 
the Nuba Mountains in Sudan) was stopped by local re-
sistance combined with disagreement amongst policy 
making perpetrators, the other (mass killings of Bosni-
ans from 1992−1995) was ended by an international 
political process but with local resistance and military 
coercion bringing Serbian groups to the table (Bellamy, 
2010, p. 599; de Waal et al., 2012, pp. 25-26).  
Yet military action, the policy which does appear 
able to end genocides and mass atrocities, carries huge 
costs and risks. In most of the cases where military in-
terventions did end atrocities, they came too late in 
the day to halt much of the killing, and were conducted 
for self-interested rather than humanitarian reasons. 
Some contemporary cases could tentatively be called 
successes—Sierra Leone in 2000, NATO’s intervention 
in Kosovo in 1999, Australian-led intervention in East 
Timor the same year, and Operation Provide Comfort 
in Northern Iraq in 1991. But they sit alongside cases 
with decidedly mixed results, including the 2011 Libya 
intervention that supported rebel forces but did not 
prevent a descent into civil war. Traditional military in-
terventions are hugely expensive—as of July 2015, US 
military operations against ISIS had cost $9.4m a day, 
at a total of $3.2bn (Shabad, 2015). They also carry 
heavy costs in human life and political capital, and they 
destabilise states and regions, themselves threaten ci-
vilians, and typically generate a need for long term re-
construction and state-building which the international 
community has rarely seemed able or willing to meet. 
When military operations lack UN sanction they may 
also erode international law, damage relationships be-
tween the world’s most powerful states, and legitimise 
unilateral action for more dubious motives (Russia no-
tably invoked the “responsibility to protect” norm dur-
ing its military intervention in Georgia in 2008). Like 
peacekeeping (see below) military interventions can al-
so exacerbate mass killing in the short run by creating a 
range of incentives for armed groups to target civilians 
more intensely (Hultman, 2010; Krain, 2005; Wood, 
Kathman, & Gent, 2012). 
There is now an effort to add greater sophistication 
to military responses. Planners highlight a wide range 
of options from fairly uncoercive “flexible deterrent” 
tools—such as security assistance arrangements, force 
deployment to nearby allies to signal resolve, surveil-
lance and monitoring operations, and so forth—
through to direct military interventions of various 
forms, from targeted “oil spot” or “demilitarised zone” 
operations through to full scale air and ground cam-
paigns (Sewall, Raymond, & Chin, 2010, pp. 65-80, 110-
115). Some such policies may further diplomatic solu-
tions, though they can also interfere with them. More 
generally, credible threats to ultimately use military ac-
tion are vital for lending force to preferable first choice 
measures like sanctions and peacekeepers (Lopez, 
2013, pp. 790-791). But these positive advances do not 
eliminate most of the concerns regarding military ac-
tion. Many of the softer forms may also simply lack 
preventive efficacy—Mathew Krain (2005, p. 380) 
notes that the “only overt military interventions that 
appear to be effective in reducing the severity of geno-
cides or politicides are those that explicitly challenge 
the perpetrators of the atrocities”. 
Peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations 
avoid some of the costs and risks of more overt military 
intervention, and fulfil functions vital to atrocity pre-
vention. But evaluative research paints a patchy record 
of efficacy. A common concern is that peacekeeping 
missions may in fact exacerbate the risk of violence and 
mass atrocities in various circumstances. They may in-
centivise killers to work more quickly to finish ethnic 
cleansing, can alter the balance of power and thereby 
increase strategic incentives for civilian targeting, and 
have ineptly provided “safe havens” which are not ad-
equately protected, and thereby concentrate civilians 
for perpetrators to target. They can also function as an 
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empty bluff in the absence of real political will that, 
once exposed, encourages further killing and under-
mines deterrence (Hultman, 2010, p. 30; Krain, 2005, 
pp. 366-368). Controlling for the fact that peacekeep-
ers are likely to be sent to more violent-prone crises 
may eliminate the finding that they tend to make 
things worse (Melander, 2009). And peacekeepers 
have clearly made a positive impact in certain cases—
often through the delivery of humanitarian aid (Weiss, 
1999, p. 22). But the statistical impact of peacekeeping 
on mass killings of civilians remains disputed. The weak 
capacity of many peacekeeping forces for the sorts of 
robust action sometimes required to prevent mass 
atrocities is one reason for their uncertain or erratic ef-
ficacy (Burgess, 2011; Tardy, 2011).  
Economic sanctions are a third major policy tool 
used by international actors, but again their record of 
performance is concerning. Sweeping comprehensive 
sanctions have been abandoned by international actors 
in light of extensive evidence on their egregious hu-
manitarian impacts—sanctions on Iraq are estimated 
to have led to 100,000 to 227,000 excess deaths 
among young children (Drezner, 2011, pp. 97-98). They 
also frequently encouraged corruption, including with-
in the UN system. As Thomas Weiss summarises, com-
prehensive sanctions are a tool which typically “afflicts 
vulnerable groups, complicates the work of humanitar-
ian agencies, causes long-term damage to the produc-
tive capacity of target nations and penalizes neigh-
bours” (Weiss, 1999, p. 500). Instead, international 
actors now deploy a range of smart or targeted sanc-
tions to pursue political objectives, including atrocity 
prevention. Targeted sanctions involve a range of item-
specific, country-specific or institution-specific excep-
tions, and use financial instruments and selective em-
bargos to target elites and bastions of regime support 
(Lopez, 2013, pp. 774-777; Tostensen & Bull, 2002; 
Weiss, 1999, p. 504). But such exceptions weaken the 
power of sanctions to actually hurt target states and, 
as Arne Tostensen and Beate Bull (2002, p. 382) put it: 
“one cannot overlook that they are a form of sanctions 
‘leakage’ and thus undermine the effectiveness of a 
sanctions regime”. Implementing the complex rules of 
targeted sanctions and preventing evasion by targets is 
also exceptionally difficult (Drezner, 2011, p. 103; 
Grebe, 2010; Lopez, 2013, p. 788; Michaelsen, 2010). 
Political obstacles in the UN Security Council have also 
been a problem for targeted sanctions, postponing im-
plementation in ways that allow targets to take adap-
tive measures, and producing watered down sanctions 
regimes of no meaningful atrocity prevention capacity 
(Lopez, 2013, 778-779). Such problems led to the heavy 
modification of a Security Council draft resolution on 
the violence in Darfur: rather than targeting sanctions 
against over thirty individuals as originally planned, the 
final measures targeted just four (Lopez, 2013, 778-
779). Some sanctions regimes may even worsen atroci-
ties. Arms embargoes can freeze existing balances of 
power and can thereby undermine resistance to state 
or non-state atrocity perpetrators—this may have oc-
curred in both Yugoslavia and Syria. Dominic Tierney 
concludes that “much of the impact of UN arms em-
bargoes in civil wars can be summarized as irrelevance 
or malevolence” (cited in Drezner, 2011, p. 103), and 
Tostensen and Bull (2002, p. 402) similarly conclude 
that “sanctions experiences generally have been disap-
pointing…the optimism expressed in some academic 
circles and among decision makers…appears largely un-
justified.” There are some plausible success stories, 
such as Libya’s 2003 renunciation of its support for ter-
rorism, and abandonment of nuclear and chemical 
weapons, and the application of pressure on Cote 
d’Ivoire and Liberia, and on Libya in 2011, though more 
research is needed to identify evidence of causal im-
pact (Jentleson, 2006; Lopez, 2013, pp. 780-784). A 
rough success rate of around 33% for sanctions is com-
monly asserted in social science research (Hufbauer, 
Schott, & Elliot, 2007; Lopez, 2013, p. 788). Again, sanc-
tions are an important atrocity-prevention tool (Lopez, 
2015). But they are both unreliable and risky. 
Another key tool for atrocity prevention lies in dip-
lomatic and mediation efforts—less controversial and 
shorn of the potential for egregious material damage 
involved in military actions and sanctions. Diplomatic 
efforts are a critical component of every effort to pre-
vent an emerging high risk of conflict or mass atrocities 
(Welsh, 2015). But they are clearly often insufficient. 
Kenya in 2007−2008 is often cited as a key example of 
diplomacy being used to prevent a mass atrocity, but 
few other clear cases have been suggested in the liter-
ature (Sharma, 2015). In light of Kenya, “coercive di-
plomacy” is frequently touted as providing the more 
robust mechanism needed to induce potential perpe-
trators to come to the table. But one major study (not 
focused on atrocities) suggests it achieves some suc-
cess in only 32% of cases, and remains reliant on out-
side actors credibly promising harder action should the 
negotiating parties fail to reach a functional agreement 
(Art, 2003, p. 405).  
The addition of international criminal justice tools 
and UN monitoring and fact-finding missions to the 
conceptualised atrocity prevention toolkit is welcome, 
but these tools are also of uncertain efficacy. Interna-
tional criminal justice tools have aided post-violence 
reconstruction and reconciliation in states, have ad-
vanced the development of relevant international law 
and, through the ICC’s complementarity principle, sup-
ported domestic legal regimes for preventing violence. 
But there is not yet any real evidence of a significant 
deterrent effect, and ICC indictments have clearly cre-
ated counterproductive rally-round-the-flag effects, 
most famously in Sudan (Peskin, 2009, pp. 307-309; 
Smith, 2012, p. 11). Fact-finding missions play a range 
of important roles, but there is again little evidence for 
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the main preventive causal mechanism attributed to 
them—the “power of witness”—through which being 
in the glare of the international community’s attention 
is hoped to deter atrocities (Grace & Bruderlein, 2012, 
p. 2). Ultimately the power of witness effect rests on 
consistent and predictable international action to con-
strain and punish those who are so witnessed, and 
since that record is at best emergent the weak present 
deterrent effect is unsurprising (Krain, 2005, pp. 366, 
378).  
3.2. How Do Ideological Interventions and Strategies 
Compare? 
A proper appreciation of the costs, prospects, 
strengths and weaknesses of the traditional conflict 
and atrocity prevention tools just surveyed sets the bar 
that ideological interventions and strategies should be 
measured against. My central argument is that they 
meet that bar. They are of a comparable order of fea-
sibility measured against cost and risk, and therefore 
ought to be a more central component of the atrocity 
prevention toolkit. 
Evaluating the impact of ideological strategies is in-
herently difficult, but three key sources of empirical re-
search provide a strong starting point for thinking that 
they can have a positive impact. The first is the exten-
sive work I summarised in section 2 on how ideological 
catalysts of and restraints on violence can be critical in 
determining where atrocities (or other forms of mass 
political violence) do and do not occur and the scale 
and intensity they take. Yanagizawa-Drott (2014, pp. 
1986, 1989-1991) concludes his study of the causal im-
pact of RTLM in Rwanda by estimating that jamming 
the radio station, as the United Nations Force Com-
mander in Rwanda, Romeo Dallaire, requested, might 
have cost around $4 million and saved upwards of 
50,000 lives, as well as reducing long-term damage to 
human capital formation and political stability. The 
number of lives saved might fall according to how the 
regime substituted for the loss of radio capability, but 
would remain substantial. The most helpful research 
on ideological causes compares contrasting cases. As 
noted above, in his extensive comparative study of 
genocides in Sudan and Rwanda with non-genocides in 
Côte d’Ivoire, Mali and Senegal, Straus (2015, p. x) 
finds that “to explain variation—to explain why coun-
tries with similar crises experience different out-
comes—the role of ideology is essential.” Gadi 
Wolfsfeld’s (2004) study of the role of media in peace 
negotiations highlights the contrast between the gen-
erally damaging role of the Hebrew press in the Oslo 
peace process, and the broadly supportive role media 
played in Northern Ireland regarding the 1998 Good 
Friday agreement. Wolfsfeld roots the contrast partly 
in differences in media norms—one target of ideologi-
cal interventions and strategies. Kurspahić’s (2003) 
study of the critical catalytic role played by the media 
in the Yugoslavian Wars and their post-conflict envi-
ronment charts the general failure of outside interven-
tion. But Kurspahić roots this failure in specific errors of 
policy, highlights what could and should have be 
achieved with superior planning and implementation, 
and emphasises the need for what I am terming ideo-
logical interventions. 
Two forms of ideological intervention are already 
widely attempted: regulation of the media environ-
ment by international interveners during and after con-
flict so as to constrain ideological dissemination (as 
Kurspahić’s book highlights), and civil society interven-
tions focused on peace building, peace broadcasting 
and peace education to promote ideological restraints 
on violence. The second main source of empirical re-
search on ideological strategies and interventions 
comes in a small number of dedicated evaluations of 
such efforts. Paul Collier’s and Pedro C. Vicente’s 
(2013) quantitative study of the impacts of ActionAid 
International Nigeria’s (AAIN) experimental interven-
tion against political violence in the Nigerian elections 
in 2007 is the most rigorous empirical examination of 
such an ideological campaign thus far. The AAIN’s two 
week campaign, in collaboration with local NGOs, 
aimed to delegitimise violent intimidation, give individ-
uals a sense of political empowerment, and promote 
collective action to resist violence. The organisers dis-
tributed 18,000 units of campaign materials (T-Shirts, 
caps, hijabs, leaflets, posters and stickers), and held 
roadshows, theatre events and town meetings in loca-
tions across Nigeria (Collier & Vicente, 2013, pp. F332-
335). Collier and Vicente’s experimental study of the 
campaign involved a baseline survey prior to the inter-
vention, and comparison of its effects in 12 enumera-
tion areas visited by AAIN campaigners with 12 control 
areas that were not (Collier & Vicente, 2013, pp. F335-
337). This “found clear and statistically significant ef-
fects of the campaign on diminishing perceptions of 
political violence and increasing empowerment of the 
population against political violence” (Collier & 
Vicente, 2013, p. F344). Even more importantly, the 
campaign reduced the actual likelihood of violence by 
47% in the areas targeted (Collier & Vicente, 2013, pp. 
F350-351). 
No other campaign against violence has been so 
thoroughly studied, but some other research projects 
exist. A study by Elizabeth Levy Paluck and Donald P. 
Green of counterviolence radio interventions in Rwan-
da found that whilst the programmes might not have 
affected the deep convictions of listeners, they sub-
stantially promoted expressions of dissent, perceptions 
of social norms, and methods of dispute resolution in 
ways conducive to non-violence (Paluck, 2009; Paluck 
& Green, 2009). An edited volume by Monroe E. Price 
and Mark Thompson (2002) includes five case studies 
of broadcast media during and after violent conflict. 
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These highlight the mixed record of ideological inter-
ventions and point to numerous improvements in future 
efforts. But they do find benefits in international efforts 
in Cambodia, Bosnia and East Timor—though more in 
post-conflict recovery than immediate prevention. 
Finally, a wider volume of evidence comes from in-
dependent assessments of the activities of civil society 
projects by groups like Search for Common Ground, 
Fondation Hirondelle, Radio La Benevolencija, Peace-
Tech Lab and Studio Ijambo. In 2008, Vladimir Bratić 
produced a list of around 40 projects in 18 countries 
that could broadly be characterised as peace broad-
casting or peace education, mainly run by such civil so-
ciety actors (Bratić, 2008, p. 495). Such projects are 
regularly subject to evaluative assessments, though 
these understandably vary in their scientific rigour (for 
one extensive collection made available by Search for 
Common Ground see http://dmeforpeace.org/learn/ 
learn-type/evaluation-reports). Since it is difficult to 
conduct an ideological intervention without having any 
positive impacts, the challenge for future empirical re-
search is to a) differentiate really significant and cost-
effective impacts reported in these assessments from 
admirable but relatively inefficient ones, and b) to 
trace whether evidence of attitude changes and a 
greater sense of security, empowerment, and pacific 
inclinations amongst those subject to such pro-
grammes translates into lower violence in the long-run. 
Still, such assessments consistently emphasise the im-
pact of campaigns in affecting attitudes towards vio-
lence, empowering resistance, and educating popula-
tions (for two notable examples of specific reports on 
impact see Kogen, 2013; Search for Common Ground, 
2012). 
So despite the need for more research, this three-
fold evidence base is encouraging, especially measured 
against the comparatively low costs and risks of ideo-
logical strategies relative to most traditional tools of 
conflict and atrocity prevention. As Edward R. Girardet 
(cited in Price & Thompson, 2002, p. viii) writes: “Gov-
ernments, international organisations, and humanitari-
an agencies…are often willing to spend hundreds of 
millions of dollars on humanitarian or peacekeeping 
operations, but are reluctant to allocate sufficient 
funding to ensure that people are properly and accu-
rately informed. Normally, this does not take a great 
deal of money.” Ideological efforts to spread accurate 
information and foster negative attitudes towards vio-
lence ought to be deployed more widely. We should 
not downplay the risks. Getting involved, directly or in-
directly, in the ideological battles of a society carries 
symbolic and physical dangers to those who do so. And 
from the more macro perspective of international pre-
vention policy, many ideological interventions create a 
tension with long-standing commitments to neutrality 
embedded in the United Nations system. It is increas-
ingly recognised, however, that this is an operating 
principle which most atrocity-prevention efforts prob-
lematise (Bellamy, 2011, p. 1). Comparatively low costs 
and risks, and prospects for a positive impact, require 
preventive actors to devote more attention to ideolog-
ical strategies. 
4. Designing Ideological Strategies in Atrocity 
Prevention 
In this final section, I provide guidelines on how ideo-
logical strategies could be formulated by relevant pre-
ventive actors. I consider, in turn: 1) what the feasible 
objectives of ideological strategies are; 2) who the rel-
evant preventive actors might be, and how different 
sorts of actors should interact; 3) what sorts of ideolog-
ical interventions these actors might deploy; and 4) 
what key principles should be followed in order to 
make ideological prevention strategies effective. 
4.1. Objectives 
To be successful, the proper aim of ideological inter-
ventions and strategies in atrocity prevention must be 
clearly conceptualised. Such campaigns cannot just im-
port an external intervener’s own notions and norms 
straight into the target society, nor radically transform 
its complex, culturally distinct ideological landscape. 
Instead, feasible ideological strategies aim to erode the 
general pervasiveness and strength of ideological justi-
fications of atrocity and bolster specific ideological re-
straints on violence against civilians. Such strategies 
should target policymaking elites, potential direct per-
petrators of violence, and broader society and its ideo-
logical environment (including major media organisa-
tions). Varying attitudes towards violence amongst all 
of these groups affect the constellation of macro, meso 
and micro level decision-making processes that lead to 
atrocities either occurring or being averted (Straus, 
2015, pp. 41-51). 
Preventive actors must recognise that the most 
committed “true believers” in anti-civilian ideologies 
will typically remain resolute in pressing for violent ac-
tion. The decisions of these sorts of individuals are bet-
ter targeted by “harder” preventive tools that alter the 
costs and benefits they care about, if possible. But the 
fact that most perpetrators of atrocities are not such 
true-believers is critical for the reasonable prospects of 
ideological strategies. This is especially true amongst 
the broader public, and this is where most existing ide-
ological efforts have focused. But even elites and po-
tential perpetrating organisations are ideologically het-
erogeneous, and will contain individuals with varying 
degrees of support, ambivalence, and reluctance to-
wards violence. Efforts (especially by local actors) 
should therefore also focus “upwards” at elites, since 
the ideological standpoint of the elites is often the 
most crucial factor in determining whether violence 
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occurs or not (Straus, 2015; Valentino, 2004). Outside 
actors might, for example, be able to share intelligence 
with elite policy makers that reduces their perceptions 
of other groups as threatening, reducing the pressure 
for atrocities. 
So effective ideological strategies do not assume it 
is possible to convince everyone or initiate mass “con-
versions” in attitudes towards violence. Instead pre-
vention efforts should contest the ideological and in-
formation monopolies which convince relatively 
ordinary people that violence may be a necessary 
course, inject doubts and reluctance into mass senti-
ment, and weaken the popular pressures for discrimi-
natory nationalist, religious or ethnic demagoguery. 
The realistic aim is to thereby shift the balance of ideo-
logical pressures—amongst elites, potential perpetra-
tors, and broader publics—in ways that create obsta-
cles for violence. Since atrocities occur as the result of 
a complex intersection of causal forces, ideological 
strategies may not “prevent” an atrocity. But they can 
encourage opposition, non-implementation, and res-
cue; hold open opportunities for alternative non-
violent courses; and result in considerably more limited 
campaigns of violence, saving large numbers of lives. 
Just as importantly, ideological strategies synergistical-
ly support other preventive actions—by delegitimising 
those who advance campaigns of violence and weaken-
ing the forces they are able to mobilise around them. 
Ideological strategies should also strengthen the social 
fabric for post-violence reconstruction and reconcilia-
tion, and they may indirectly serve broader conflict 
prevention and counter-terrorism objectives. 
4.2. Actors 
Ideological prevention can be conducted by a range of 
actors: the United Nations, regional organisations, ex-
ternal states, international or local non-governmental 
organisations, or even the governments of at-risk soci-
eties themselves. But for all ideological strategies, cul-
tural and context sensitivity and a primary reliance on 
local authorities, movements, organisations and voices 
for most of the “front-line” ideological work is critical. 
As Thompson and Price (2003, p. 195) remark (regard-
ing media development, but the point should be a guid-
ing principle for most ideological interventions) efforts 
are “best designed and implemented by non-
governmental actors—professionals and activists—with 
IGOs and governments lending assistance as required.” 
This is both normatively important, but also a prac-
tical requirement for success. In most societies, exter-
nal actors, organisations and states have far lower 
credibility, authority and ideological influence than lo-
cal actors, and lack the expertise local actors have in 
navigating their contextually rich ideological landscape 
(see also Gregg, 2010, p. 293). The exception might be 
particularly respected individuals with international 
reach. The British and US governments are not likely, 
for example, to have significant ideological influence 
over potential perpetrators of ISIS atrocities. But Dr. 
Muhammad Tahir-ul-Qadri, the world respected Islam-
ic scholar who published the first authoritative fatwa 
against terrorism and suicide bombing in 2010, might.7 
Non-governmental organisations, national or transna-
tional, are also potentially powerful. Patrice McMahon 
(2007) highlights the role of such organisations in the 
avoidance of ethnic violence in Eastern Europe, and 
they may also be vital for mobilising action by external 
actors, when needed, to deter or intervene to prevent 
violence, as Geoffrey Robinson (2010) shows regarding 
East Timor in 1999. External actors are, however, 
needed to bring important financial, technological and 
educative resources and to provide expertise and co-
ordination. A major expansion in such support by the 
world’s most powerful states and leading international 
organisations will be an important first move in step-
ping up ideological prevention efforts. There are also, 
as I discuss below, particular sorts of intervention that 
external actors are best placed to conduct.  
So an effective overall strategy of prevention vitally 
rests on cross-scale mobilisation, co-operation and co-
ordination. Christian Gerlach (2010) has influentially 
highlighted how extremely violent practices typically 
rest on the mobilisation of coalitions of actors with in-
terests in violence. In parallel, the only effective way to 
generate powerful practices of counterviolence is to 
mobilise coalitions of the many international, regional, 
national and sub-national forces with interests in pre-
venting atrocities. This is particularly important in light 
of the trade-offs that exist between different desirable 
aspects of ideological interventions, such as impartiali-
ty. More impartial strategies (like providing reliable 
sources of basic information, propagating awareness of 
legal commitments and international norms, or dissem-
inating public calls for intergroup dialogue) have the 
advantage of maintaining actors’ credibility amongst 
multiple target audiences, but may be of weak force in 
countering the really pernicious justifications of vio-
lence. The reverse is true of more committed cam-
paigning, and the loss of impartiality involved could be 
damaging to other prevention tools or discrediting to 
the local actors one is seeking to support (Babbitt, 
2012, pp. 375-384). Balancing such trade-offs is easier 
when actors can create a co-ordinated division of la-
bour between different sorts of stakeholders: the Unit-
ed Nations may be well placed to fill more impartial 
functions, whilst concerned external states or regional 
organisations such as the African Union, OSCE, Arab 
                                                          
7 Qadri has also recently published an Islamic Curriculum on 
Peace and Counter-Terrorism through his non-governmental 
organisation Minhaj-ul-Quran, see http://www.minhajpubli 
cations.com/latest-books-peace-deradicalisation-counter-
terrorism 
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League or European Union may provide key resources 
and capacity to local actors, who themselves actually 
take on the more explicit campaigning. 
4.3. Interventions 
Specific ideological interventions can be schematised 
according to two vital dimensions—systemic vs target-
ed, and coercive vs persuasive. The former distinction 
tracks whether the intervention/strategy is a long run 
campaign to change the ideological environment in a 
state that simply carries a considerable background risk 
of future violence/atrocity, or a reactive, short-run in-
tervention to counter an escalating risk of imminent 
atrocities (Reike, Sharma, & Welsh, 2015). The second 
distinction captures whether the intervention is an at-
tempt to consensually change attitudes and beliefs, or 
a forcible action, usually aimed at disabling the produc-
tion and dissemination of anti-civilian ideologies 
(Leader Maynard, 2015, pp. 218-224). Both distinctions 
are continua, but simplifying them dichotomously pro-
duces an efficient summary (not exhaustive) of major 
ideological interventions and strategies, as in Table 1: 
Table 1. Major forms of ideological intervention. 
 Persuasive Coercive 
Systemic - Peace broadcasting 
- Peace education 
- Pluralisation 
- Criminalisation 
- Chartering 
Targeted - Peace broadcasting 
- Empowering resisters 
- Jamming 
- Destruction 
At the systemic-persuasive level are the existing efforts 
of local and transnational civil society organisations to 
engage in peace broadcasting (the propagation of ideas 
through major media) and peace education (participa-
tory pedagogic and training practices). A third system-
ic-persuasive ideological intervention, pluralisation in-
volves seeking to generate greater access to a wider 
range of media (in the broadest sense) in recognition 
of the particular danger of ideological monopolies. For 
example, pluralisation might involve encouraging more 
penetration by international media organisations such 
as the BBC, Al Jazeera, and CNN, all generally rated as 
highly trustworthy by citizens which have access to 
them in states across the world (Geniets, 2011). These 
cannot be captured by local anti-civilian ideologies, and 
undermine the monopolies within which those ideolo-
gies can come to appear like “common sense”. Increas-
ing access to online social media is also important, alt-
hough as well as providing a means for opening up the 
ideological monopolies of closed or partially closed so-
cieties, these can facilitate radicalisation within online 
ideological “echo chambers” (Schissler, 2014; Thomp-
son, 2011). Less obvious methods include international 
educational and vocational exchanges, or publishing in-
ternationally collaborative school textbooks. 
Coercive-systemic measures include the establish-
ment of legal regimes that obstruct the production and 
dissemination of anti-civilian ideology. Sometimes this 
may involve criminalisation of incitement or extreme 
forms of dangerous speech, and the provision of easily 
accessible avenues for civil actions against the dissemi-
nation of slander and libellous rumours and claims. 
Equally, measures I shall term chartering, in which me-
dia organisations, political parties, intellectual bodies 
or other relevant ideological producers commit to le-
gally enforced standards for reporting, political cam-
paigning, or education offer a somewhat less coercive 
measure that can still be given legal teeth. 
Systemic ideological interventions are generally 
more powerful than targeted interventions. Ideological 
change is a very real phenomenon, but generally takes 
time. And in the crisis environments where risks of 
atrocity sharply escalate, radicalizing appeals have var-
ious advantages over calls for moderation and re-
straint. Nevertheless, targeted ideological interven-
tions exist and may be vital in generating obstacles to 
violence and reducing participation and death rates. 
The most important targeted-persuasive ideological in-
tervention is likely to be empowering resisters. Perpe-
trators of atrocities typically identify and even compile 
lists of opponents and moderates, whether individuals 
or groups, who are often early targets of violence. Pre-
ventive actors should also have an up-to-date aware-
ness of such potential resisters of violence—religious 
leaders, political figures, intellectuals, and the leading 
members of major social movements—and can offer 
them protection, asylum, co-ordination, resources to 
propagate ideological restraints on violence, or other 
forms of support. Peace broadcasting also remains rel-
evant at this level (whereas peace education is general-
ly only feasible at the systemic level). Saturating a soci-
ety with moderate voices and ideological restraints on 
violence could fragment violent campaigns, encourag-
ing desertion and non-participation. 
The most controversial, but better practiced, forms 
of targeted intervention are coercive—the jamming of 
ideological dissemination and disabling, capture or de-
struction of relevant hardware (Price, 2000). By jam-
ming, I denote all coercive methods that block dissem-
ination without causing lasting human or physical 
damage. This may include shutting down websites, dis-
abling SMS networks, banning or breaking up extremist 
rallies or even detaining radical preachers and inciters, 
as well as the blocking of radio and television transmis-
sions. Destruction, by contrast, involves the infliction of 
lasting damage or harm, ideally only infrastructural but 
often also human. Radio and television installations 
that cannot be feasibly jammed might be physically 
disabled or destroyed, or the most influential and ex-
treme articulators of anti-civilian ideologies can even 
be killed. But in most circumstances, destruction will 
prove highly counterproductive to atrocity-prevention 
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efforts. Such acts fuel the narratives of atrocity-
justifiers, delegitimise preventive actors, and fragment 
the coalitions of such actors necessary for effective 
prevention, by placing local partners in a bind in decid-
ing whether to support an attack that may have killed 
their co-nationals or to denounce their international al-
lies. Such actions are, however, part of the conceptual 
space of ideological intervention tools, and fuller nor-
mative investigation than I can provide here is neces-
sary to conclude when if ever such actions are justified. 
Jamming is more likely to be of use to preventive ac-
tors. But the international community still lacks clear 
guidelines on when jamming might be justified and ap-
propriate in atrocity-justification efforts. Again, all tar-
geted-coercive measures (and most systemic-coercive 
measures) also raise free speech concerns that require 
consideration. 
4.4. Making Ideological Strategies Effective 
Nevertheless, such free speech concerns are not simply 
overriding. It is critical, if mass atrocities are to be pre-
vented, to resist the alluring metaphor of a ‘market-
place of ideas’, where the sufficiently free circulation of 
ideas is assumed to create the best chances for truth 
and morality to thrive. This misguided metaphor, and 
an accompanying faith in the auto-corrective proper-
ties of freer and freer speech, remains problematically 
influential amongst many state and non-state actors 
involved in violent contexts (Allen & Stremlau, 2005, 
pp. 3-10). Yet it lacks empirical foundation, and funda-
mentally fails to appreciate how the production and 
consumption of ideology actually works. Real world so-
cieties, especially those at most risk of atrocities, do 
not match idealised images of truth-seeking public 
communicative spaces. As a now extensive body of re-
search in psychology, sociology and communication 
studies emphasises, ordinary consumers of ideology are 
not strongly motivated by how well-grounded claims are 
in real evidence, and ideological producers frequently 
have strong commercial and political agendas driving 
what they produce (see Boudon, 1989; Cohen, 2001; 
Edelman, 1977; Glaeser, 2005; Jost, Federico, & Napier, 
2013; McChesney, 2004; Varki & Brower, 2013). These 
non-epistemic motives of both producers and consumers 
often give them huge incentives to articulate and believe 
in utterly false or dangerous ideas—as the unyielding 
resilience of many political myths in the freest media 
environments demonstrates (IPSOS MORI, 2014). Ideo-
logical producers have become extremely sophisticated 
at packaging even the most absurd claims so as to 
seem reasonable and compelling. And consumers of 
ideology rarely cross-check facts, rarely shop around 
for alternatives to their traditional sources of infor-
mation, are often religiously or politically committed to 
key “epistemic authorities”, and often lack the capacity 
to check up on many claims.  
Consequently, both mainstream news media and 
social media online have willingly justified, supported, 
denied or covered up mass atrocities, notably in Nazi 
Germany and Yugoslavia (Allen & Stremlau, 2005, p. 2; 
Kurspahić, 2003; Straus, 2015, p. 48; see also Schissler, 
2014). As Wolfsfeld (2004, pp. 15-23) points out, free 
media are especially likely to distort reality in conflict-
prone and peace-building contexts, due to misalign-
ment between the incentive structures of news media 
and the requirements of a peace process. “Peace is 
most likely to develop within a calm environment,” 
Wolfsfeld argues, “and the media have an obsessive in-
terest in threats and violence. Peace building is a com-
plex process and the news media deal with simple 
events. Progress towards peace requires at least a min-
imal understanding of the needs of the other side, but 
the news media reinforce ethnocentrism and hostility 
towards adversaries.” (Wolfsfeld, 2004, p. 2) The “epis-
temic tyranny” of closed societies may be the biggest 
obstacle to a well-informed and morally reflective pub-
lic, but an unregulated “epistemic anarchy”, where a 
panoply of agenda-driven organisations and groups are 
able to propagate entirely unfounded claims, and 
where citizens lack reliable reference points and the 
skills and resources to interrogate ideology, is not 
much better. 
The solution has two components that should be 
embedded in ideological strategies to prevent atroci-
ties. First, an epistemic rule of law—a regulated media 
and political environment that protects free speech 
rights but also sets standards for the assertion of facts 
under the authority of “news”, and commits major 
ideological producers to ethical best practices (Bratić, 
2008, p. 501). Where media function effectively to 
promote rights, democracy, and non-violence, it has 
not been due to the stripping away of all regulation, 
but due to an effective balance of standards and 
checks (though worryingly ones that, in many wealthy 
states, have been progressively dismantled, see 
McChesney, 2004). And these should be supported by 
responsible media norms (Wolfsfeld, 2004, pp. 38-43). 
This makes it much harder for dangerous local or na-
tional ideological monopolies to emerge.  
Second, a concerted effort by preventive actors to 
actually participate in that ideological environment in a 
strategic and locally rooted fashion is vital. There is no 
truly “neutral” interaction with the ideological envi-
ronments in which mass atrocities are a significant risk, 
and to refuse to engage systematically in bolstering 
forces that uphold rights and call for non-violence is 
simply to retire from the field of battle and allow other 
ideological protagonists to dominate social space. All 
atrocities, though typically witnessed by the world as a 
sudden event, are rooted in longer term processes of 
social radicalisation involving ideological campaigning. 
The same must be true of ideological efforts to prevent 
atrocities (Bratić, 2008, pp. 500-501). These cannot rely 
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on idealised assumptions of perfectly rational actors, 
who will be won over as soon as they presented with 
the “best” arguments. Instead ideological strategies 
must be based on realistic theories of political thinking 
and persuasion rooted in leading psychological and so-
ciological research (Della Vigna & Gentzkow, 2010; 
Gardner, 2006; Jost & Major, 2001). The non-epistemic 
motives behind belief formation need to be engaged 
with, and strategies should draw on the expertise of the 
communications specialists, media strategists, public re-
lations industries, and political campaigners who are 
best practised at ideological battles in the real world.  
As noted, ideological strategies need to erode justi-
fications of atrocities and embed ideological restraints. 
My identification of six justificatory mechanisms for 
atrocities is intended to highlight the diversity of path-
ways through which atrocities can come to look per-
missible or even desirable, and consequently highlight 
how a broad range of restraining responses are re-
quired. Theorists of atrocity prevention have already 
identified some of the powerful pacific norms that 
should be generated: Alex Bellamy (2012a, p. 180) pro-
poses “universalism”, Hugo Slim (2007, p. 277) “humani-
zation” and David J. Simon (2012, p. 6) “humanism” and 
“non-divisionism”. These are well chosen, since dehu-
manisation, moral exclusion and the portrayal of some 
social groups as fundamentally lacking legitimate mem-
bership in the state are critical foundations for the justi-
fication of violence (Alvarez, 2008; Leader Maynard, 
2015, pp. 195-199; Opotow, 1990; Straus, 2015). But 
such norms are also insufficient—they block some 
paths of justification for atrocities but leave others 
open (for example, the presentation of violence as vir-
tuous and heroic, or the denial of alternatives to vio-
lence). So we need to flesh out these concepts into a 
better ideological map for counterviolence. Existing re-
search suggests six main overlapping ideological re-
straints on atrocities that provide a starting point for 
thinking about more comprehensive future efforts. 
First, as Bellamy and Simon identify, the fragment-
ing of societies into divided groups is key to mass vio-
lence. Conversely, appeals to inclusive unity at the na-
tional or communal level, which do not cast some 
members as outsiders, have been effective in resisting 
violence. Straus (2015) finds that more inclusive found-
ing narratives were critical to non-occurrences of gen-
ocides in Africa, and Susan Benesch (2014) identifies 
the proliferation of inclusive discourses surrounding 
the build-up to the relatively peaceful 2013 elections in 
Kenya as a potentially important pacific force. Second, 
as human rights norms have spread they have created 
fundamental and well-researched challenges to inter-
group discrimination and state-led violence (Risse-
Kappen, Ropp, & Sikkink, 1999; Sikkink, 2011). Third, 
the ideological embedding and institutionalisation of 
civilian immunity has been critical to changing military 
practices by many world states—resulting in a notable 
reduction, though not elimination, of war time atroci-
ties (Bellamy, 2012b, pp. 220-222, 300-348). Fourth, 
just as violence can be valorised and portrayed as vir-
tuous, so it can be subject to devalorisation by peace 
messages that exhort virtues of non-violence, and dis-
parage violence as irresponsible, disruptive and hooli-
ganistic (Benesch, 2014). Fifth, violence is much less like-
ly if key actors, groups and broader populations can be 
convinced of its inefficacy, and in particular, the risk it 
poses to critical social objectives like economic devel-
opment and political stability. Finally, deeper rejections 
of violence as in pacifist or pacificist doctrines (Ceadel, 
1987), and the promotion of social change through non-
violent methods like civil disobedience and peaceful pro-
test can massively alter the way in which societies re-
spond to those who call for violence—as in the AAIN 
campaign reported on by Collier and Vicente (2013).  
This is not an exhaustive list. Credibility attacks on 
those calling for violence, highlighting the crimes with 
which they have been associated, or otherwise under-
mining their epistemic and normative authority, may 
also, for example, be effective. But these six restraints 
provide a starting point for thinking about the content 
of ideological preventive action. 
Like all prevention, ideological interventions and 
strategies to prevent mass atrocities rest crucially on 
will—although they are not as demanding in this re-
spect as some other tools. But as Richard Caplan (2011, 
p. 131) points out, a major determinant of the will to 
prevent is the capacity to prevent. Actors will show 
more will to deploy ideological strategies if these have 
been well prepared and the necessary practical tools 
are in place. States, organisations and civil society ac-
tors thus need to continue to develop the international 
counterviolence architecture needed for ideological 
strategies of prevention: the institutions, professional 
networks, ground-level operations, funding arrange-
ments, epistemic communities and hardware neces-
sary for both strategic and targeted, and coercive and 
persuasive, preventive action. Such an architecture is 
already partially developed with respect to peacebuild-
ing and conflict prevention (and also the rather differ-
ent field of military PSYOP practices) but needs to be 
extended to mass atrocities. One important and easy 
advance, already underway, is to insert an “atrocity-
prevention lens” (Bellamy, 2011, 2015) into existing 
practices and structures. And an immediate step for 
preventive actors is to make sure that such an atrocity-
prevention lens includes attention to ideological strat-
egies in those organisations with explicit prevention 
mandates: United Nations agencies, regional actors 
committed to prevention like the African Union and 
ECOWAS, and relevant state institutions. But greater 
capacity-building is also needed—of both hardware 
(material resources, institutional capacity, volunteers 
and organisations) and software (educational materi-
als, training, knowledge and imagery).  
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5. Conclusion 
In this article, I have argued that ideology plays a criti-
cal but complex role in shaping the probabilities of 
mass atrocities, and the extent and pattern of violence 
where atrocities do occur. Ideological fanatics are rela-
tively rare, but more partial, selective, ambivalent, or 
latent forms of ideological internalisation allow anti-
civilian ideologies to alter the behaviour of large num-
bers of ordinary people. Variation in ideological atti-
tudes and beliefs is therefore one key factor explaining 
inter-case and intra-case variation in violence. For this 
reason, greater planning and implementation of ideo-
logical strategies to prevent mass atrocities is urgently 
needed. On comparison with other prevention tools, 
ideological strategies are not fanciful or impractical 
relative to their costs and risks. They are unlikely to 
lead to wholesale conversions of the true believers in 
anti-civilian ideologies. But they can erode the broader 
appeal of those ideologies, bolster the sorts of ideologi-
cal restraints that discourage participation in campaigns 
of violence, and alter the balance of ideological pres-
sures on both elite policy makers and ordinary citizens.  
This paper provides initial guidelines for thinking 
about the range of available ideological interventions, 
and how they might best be used as part of broader 
synergistic applications of multiple prevention tools. 
Both actors with explicit atrocity-prevention mandates 
and those who are stakeholders in any high risk set-
ting—be they citizens, local organisations, transnation-
al organisations, governments, neighbouring states, re-
gional organisations or international bodies—can and 
should deploy ideological strategies. But ideological ef-
forts to prevent mass atrocities remain at their earliest 
stages: more research is needed. Atrocities by transna-
tional non-state organisations like ISIS, which draw on 
a narrow slice of radicalised supporters from across the 
globe rather than broader support within an estab-
lished society, present particular challenges. Research 
on terrorist radicalisation and counter-radicalisation 
needs to be brought into work on ideology and atroci-
ties more generally if we are to advance thinking on 
how to prevent anti-civilian violence by terroristic, 
criminal, paramilitary and other non-state actors (Hor-
gan & Braddock, 2010; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008). 
Nevertheless, persisting intellectual and practical 
challenges are intrinsic to the life-cycle of prevention 
tools. More established methods, especially military op-
erations and economic sanctions, went through many 
extremely costly failures before it really became feasible 
to think that they might be used with good prospects for 
success. Refining ideological interventions and strategies 
will similarly take time, involving failures and only partial 
successes. But that learning process promises to be less 
costly than it is for most other tools. And it may ultimate 
provide a powerful, inspiring, and non-violent compo-
nent of a functional atrocity prevention toolkit. 
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